Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both stages, it is shown that under certain conditions, announcement of contributions generates higher expected total contribution. Contribution announcement plays a similar positive role even when the charity acquires information about donor valuations prior to actual fundraising and can take actions to mitigate incomplete information among donors.
Following the devastation caused by tsunami over large parts of South East Asia on December 26, 2004 , the world's leading countries got together to help the millions affected by the event. The pledges made by governments of various countries rose to over $8 billion quickly, by January 12, 2005.
1 The US government had first pledged $15 million, then increased it to $35 million and, later on, increased the amount to $350 million.
2 A report in the International Herald Tribune soon announced, ÔJapan's pledge made the US package the second-largest promised so farÕ. 3 The same report also noted an increase of pledge by Taiwan from an initial figure of $5 million to a subsequent $50 million. Some of the other countries similarly adjusted their pledges upwards. 4, 5 The above episode is one illustration of the fact that in a large number of fundraising drives by charities and other non-profit organisations, individual donors may contribute multiple times (often, by adding to their pledges) as they learn about the contributions made by other donors. Announcement of contributions appears to increase the incentive for donors to add to their contributions and contribute higher total amounts to the charity than they would had they not learnt about the contributions made by others. This is somewhat paradoxical as ÔconventionalÕ analysis of strategic voluntary contribution to public goods suggests that announcement of contributions ought to increase the incentive of early donors to free-ride on later donors and, to that extent, have a negative impact on the funds raised; further, donors ought to have no incentive to contribute early and repeatedly.
In this article, we argue that incomplete information about the independent private valuation of charities by individual donors explains why announcement of donations can generate multiple contributions from individual donors in course of the fund-drive and increase the expected total funds contributed, thus providing a strategic rationale for charities, political parties or international bodies involved in fundraising (with a common objective) to announce donations during the campaign. Besides explaining a well-observed phenomenon, our argument also implies a normative prescription that fundraisers for charities and other public goods ought to announce donations -particularly when potential donors are sufficiently dispersed and ignorant of each othersÕ valuations or preferences. It also tangentially sheds some light on the effect of legislation requiring political parties to publicly reveal large donations in fundraising drives; while such legislation is usually motivated by the desire for political transparency and for minimising the influence of organised special interests, our analysis shows that it may actually enable political parties to raise more funds.
Our argument is developed in a Bayesian model of two-stage fundraising where potential donors may contribute to a charity at either or both stages (endogenous move). The total contribution at the end of the fund-drive determines the provision of the charity which is a public good. Potential donors care only about provision of the charity and their marginal valuation of the charity is private information. From a gametheoretic point of view, announcement of contributions during the fund-drive makes the contribution game a two-stage simultaneous move game (sometimes, called a Ôrepeated contribution gameÕ) while non-announcement effectively reduces it to a oneshot simultaneous move game.
We show that announcement of contributions at the end of the first stage can generate (perfect Bayesian) equilibria where donors contribute repeatedly and, under certain conditions, generate higher expected total contribution relative to the fundraising scheme with no announcement. Moreover, under these conditions, no equilibrium of the contribution game with announcement generates lower expected total contributions compared to the game without announcement.
The main argument is as follows. Announcement of contributions leads to the possibility that first-stage contributions of high-valuation donors may reveal their true types and this increases the incentive of contributors to free-ride on them in later stages of the multistage fund-drive. This, in turn, creates a strategic incentive for highvaluation donors to hide their types in the first stage and indeed, in every equilibrium, no information about types of donors is revealed at the end of the first stage. The second stage of the fund-drive is therefore almost the same as a one-shot simultaneous move game except for a certain level of contribution from the first stage that is now exogenously given. If the ÔpoolingÕ contribution level that allows players to hide their types in the first stage is small, then the outcome of the second-stage game is simply a modification of the outcome of a one-shot simultaneous move game where contributions are reduced by exactly the amount of the first-stage total contribution, i.e., perfect crowding out occurs and the game generates the same outcome as a funddrive with no announcement of contributions. However, if the pooling contribution level in the first round is high, then the crowding out of donations that it causes in the second round is imperfect and this can lead to higher expected total contribution relative to that in fundraising with no announcement. The strategic incentives created by donors having private information about their valuations play a critical role in this argument.
Next, we analyse an extended model where the fundraiser acquires information about private valuations (or, socio-economic attributes correlated with valuations) of potential donors through pre-campaign research or previous fundraising experience and can choose to reveal this information partially or fully to potential donors prior to actual fundraising. Examples of such information transmission include pre-fundraising events that bring together potential donors and create publicity and other information links between donors that eventually allow donors to find out more about each other. As our main argument rests on incomplete information among donors, it is important to check whether it can hold even when the charity may, in principle, mitigate the extent of incomplete information. We show that even when the charity has full information about private valuations of donors, announcement of contributions continues to be a better strategy for fundraising. In particular, we show that when the fund-drive is designed as one where contributions are not announced, the optimal information transmission strategy of the fundraiser will generate full information for all potential donors prior to the contribution game. In contrast, if the fund-drive is designed as one where contributions are announced, optimal information revelation strategy of the fundraiser may not lead to full information among potential donors. Further, the expected total contribution in the latter case may exceed the former. In other words, the strategic advantage of contribution announcement continues to hold even when the fundraiser has the option of mitigating the extent of incomplete information.
There is a sizeable literature on dynamic voluntary contribution to a public good where players are free to contribute any amount at any point of time and may contribute repeatedly. Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) analyse an infinite duration game with continuous contributions and flow benefits where the playersÕ contributions accumulate over time and show that the free-riding problem is aggravated when playersÕ contributions are conditional on the observable collective contributions. This, in effect, suggests that charities ought not to announce contributions so that current contributors cannot free-ride on future contributors. 6 In a game of repeated voluntary contributions to a public good where the total contribution generated in each period is announced, Marx and Matthews (2000) show that there exist equilibria where intertemporal free-riding tendencies are largely overcome and Ônearly efficientÕ outcomes achieved through the use of appropriate punishment strategies for not adhering to more ÔcooperativeÕ behaviour. While their argument does provide a rationale for announcement of contributions, it is not particularly relevant to fundraising drives by charities and other organisations where the time span is limited; the usual logic of long horizon multi-period games for inducing cooperation through punishment strategies does not readily apply. Romano and Yildirim (2001) analyse a two-stage game of voluntary contribution to a public good with endogenous moves 7 and show that the announcement of contributions can lead to a higher total contribution if donors care about individual levels of contributions by players in addition to the total contribution, thus allowing for snob appeal, warm glow etc.
8 A discussion of this kind of effect for a more general class of accumulation games is contained in Romano and Yildrim (2005) . Our argument in this article complements their explanation and it applies to more conventional contexts where such psychological effects may not be strong. In our model, donors simply care about the public good provided by the charity (which depends only on total contributions).
Our article specifically forms a part of the literature on incomplete information models of dynamic voluntary contribution to public goods. Much of this literature (Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; Gradstein, 1992; Vega-Redondo, 1995) focuses on the specific question of inefficiency due to costly delay in contributions resulting from incomplete information. This is not directly relevant to the question we address in this article. Andreoni (2006a) considers a contribution game with endogenous donor moves where the quality of the charity is unknown, may be learnt by incurring a cost and signalled by an initial donor; this leads to a war-of-attrition type problem and it is shown that the wealthiest choose to be leaders in equilibrium and that leadership grants, if announced, can act as signals of quality. The signalling role of announced leadership grants may be seen as an indirect justification for announcement of contributions. However, it does not explain why many charities tend to announce all contributions -not just the leadership grants. Also, the problem of the quality of a charity being unknown does not apply well to programmes of established charities that have been ongoing for a while. Finally, even when the quality or productivity of the charity is unknown, it may not be possible for donors to acquire additional information about the charity at the fundraising stage -for example, when pledges are made by donors after natural disasters, it is almost impossible to acquire information in advance about how well the funds are going to be utilised (beyond what is publicly known). While the argument developed in our article is also based on incomplete information, we focus on uncertainty about independent private valuations of the charity (rather than its common value). Further, the process by which announcement generates higher contribution is not through acquiring or signalling of information.
The existing literature on charitable contributions also contains several other explanations of announcement of contributions that require potential donors to contribute in pre-determined order of moves. Announcement of contributions then generates a sequential game of perfect information among donors while non-announcement generates a simultaneous move game. In a fundraising situation with natural leaders and followers among contributors, Andreoni (1998) showed that if the production technology of the public good exhibits non-convexity such as a minimal threshold requirement for the public good to be of any value, announcement by the charity of an initial leadership gift generates higher contributions by follower donors. 8 Most of their analysis deals with showing that announcement raises the total contribution in a sequential game where contributors move in a pre-determined sequence. Harbaugh (1998) also modelled warm-glow and prestige motives, while Glazer and Konrad (1996) suggest a wealth-signalling motive, but neither paper explains why donation announcements are often made while the fundraising is still in progress and not necessarily after its completion. See also Andreoni (1990) . 9 In a somewhat different approach, Cornelli (1996) notes the importance of announcement of contributions (or sales) in the monopoly provisions of services with fixed costs such as theatres and performing arts where patrons with relatively high valuations need to subscribe voluntarily to a larger share of the cost burden in order for the service to be provided. This explanation is a powerful one -particularly for capital campaigns and for ventures with large fixed costs. However, it is not as relevant for campaigns to expand the scope and outreach of pre-existing programmes and for projects with no significant non-convexity or threshold requirements. Further, it does not explain why charities continue to announce donations beyond the initial leadership grants or once the minimum threshold has been met. Vesterlund (2003) shows that announcement may signal the unknown common value of a charity if donors can acquire information at a cost and later donors can learn this information from announced contributions of earlier donors; this explanation requires not only that there be natural leading donors, but that they are also able to acquire prior information about the charity at reasonable cost which, as mentioned earlier, may not be possible in large number of situations.
10
More generally, this class of models assumes that the fundraiser can pre-commit not to accept donations from donors who want to contribute earlier than their assigned move or from donors who want to add to their contributions later; further, they do not explain why donors contribute multiple times. 11 In contrast, our article shows that even when donors may freely choose when, how much and how many times to contribute during the fundraising drive, there is an important role for announcement of contribution in raising the size of the funds generated.
The article is organised as follows. The next Section presents the basic model and the contribution game. Section 2 reviews the outcomes of the contribution game with no announcement of donations. Section 3 analyses the equilibria of the contribution game with announcement of donations. The comparison of the outcomes of these two games in terms of expected total contribution is assessed in Section 4. Section 5 studies the issue of information transmission by charities. Section 6 concludes. The proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
Basic Framework
There are two potential contributors, called players and indexed by i ¼ 1, 2. Each player i divides his wealth W i > 0 between private consumption v i ! 0 and a contribution g i ! 0 to the public good:
Each player's utility depends only on the total amount of the public good created,
and the amount of private consumption; we do not consider the prestige value or warm-glow motives of donations. The utility functions are quasi-linear:
where V : R þ ! R þ is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable with V 0 (AE) > 0 and V 00 (AE) < 0. Each player's utility from the public good depends also on his type s -high-value (H) or low-value (L) -and is parameterised by t s , with t H > t L .
The distribution of player iÕs type is common knowledge: type H occurs with probability p i and type L with probability 1 À p i . The realised type of each player is only known to the player himself. Players maximise expected utility. We assume two-sided incomplete information:
Define the standalone contribution by a player of type s, denoted by x s , to be his optimal public good contribution if he knows that he is the only contributor:
We assume that the players are not wealth-constrained and t L V 0 (0) > 1, so that x s s are well-defined and interior. It is easy to see that x H > x L and no player of type s will make a positive contribution if he believes that the other player is going to contribute at least x s with certainty.
We consider a fundraising drive with two rounds of contribution -called Round 1 and Round 2. Players contribute simultaneously in both rounds. As players may contribute strictly positive amounts in either or both rounds, this is a multi-stage game of endogenous moves.
We consider and compare two variants of this fundraising scheme: with and without public announcement of individual contributions at the end of the first round. It is assumed that no player directly observes the contribution made by the other player so that announcement by the fundraiser is the only way a player gets to know about the action chosen by the other player in the first round. The solution concept used is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
As in much of the literature on charitable fundraising, the fundraiser is only interested in the size of total contribution. We assume that the fundraiser is risk-neutral and therefore ranks alternative campaign designs according to the (ex ante) expected total contribution of the two players.
Contribution Game with No Announcement
In this Section, we consider the game among potential donors generated by a fundraising drive where no contribution is announced at the end of the first round. It is easy to check that this is equivalent to a one-shot simultaneous move contribution game. In what follows, we analyse this one-shot contribution game and its Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcomes will be interchangeably referred to as outcomes of fundraising with no announcement.
Let y s i denote the equilibrium contribution of player i, i ¼ 1, 2, of type s, s ¼ H, L, solving the following expected utility maximisation problem:
The net marginal expected utility for player i of type s which determines his incentive to contribute is given by: 12 The qualitative nature of our analysis largely remains unchanged for one-sided incomplete information where only one player's type is known with certainty.
It follows that for any player the low type never contributes more, and generally less, than the high type's contribution. Also, for any given pair of contributions by (the two types of) player j, player i Õs incentive to contribute is decreasing in p j . Given the nature of the first-order conditions to be written below, in general it is not possible to guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium contributions or even expected total contribution in the one-shot game. However, for later analysis it is relevant to note here that H-type players will always make strictly positive contributions:
Given Lemma 1, the first-order conditions for an equilibrium can thus be written as:
with equalities holding for strictly positive-valued y 
Contribution Game with Announcement
We now consider the contribution game where, at the end of the first round, the fundraiser publicly announces the individual contributions by both players, allowing each player to further update his belief about the other player's type before making the second-round contribution.
Non-revealing Equilibrium
In this game, one might expect that in equilibrium, the announced first-round contributions of players might reveal some information about their types so that, after updating, players are more informed about each othersÕ types in the second round of fundraising. Surprisingly, this does not happen in equilibrium. In every perfect Bayesian equilibrium, each player's first-round contribution is independent of his type. The high-valuation donor has a strong incentive to pool with the low-type donor in the first round in order to hide his type for otherwise he may have to bear a very high burden of contribution in the second round. This holds as long as the contribution of the low-valuation donor is not too large. If, however, the latter is at a level large enough to dissuade the high-valuation donor from pooling, then it is the low-valuation donor who wants to deviate and pool with the high-valuation donor.
Denote the contributions in the first round by w
Proposition 1. In every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the two-rounds contribution game with announcement, the first-round contributions satisfy: w
Construction of Equilibrium
Proposition 1 implies that every equilibrium of the contribution game with announcement is characterised by a pooling outcome in which both types of each player contribute an identical amount in Round 1 (the amounts may well differ between the players) so that at the beginning of Round 2 the beliefs about player types are same as the original beliefs at the start of Round 1. We now construct a class of such equilibria. Consider the one-shot contribution game (i.e., that generated by no announcement) discussed in the previous Section. Let us definẽ
Þ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the one-shot gameg: ð1Þ
In other words,ỹ is the highest possible total contribution in any equilibrium of the contribution game with no announcement when both players are of type L. Observe that
As before, we denote the contributions in the first round of the contribution game with announcement by w
The contributions in the second round of this game are denoted by z
PlayersÕ beliefs at the beginning of Round 2 are same as at the beginning of Round 1. Off-equilibrium beliefs (and play) are specified as follows. If player i deviates and contributes an amount w 6 ¼w i in Round 1, then beliefs are that player i is H-type with probability one and in the continuation play in the second round, equilibrium prescribes z L j ¼ z H j ¼ 0 and player i is expected to contribute maxfx H À ðw þw j Þ; 0g.
, then the first-order conditions corresponding to y H 2 > 0 and y L 2 > 0 would hold with equality; see Section 2. But since t L < t H , the first-order equality conditions are not compatible.) 14 A donor can easily Ôcompensate forÕ a low level of contribution in the first round while contributing in the second round. Therefore, a first-round deviation by player i to a contribution level beloww i does not really say anything about his type; it cannot be argued that a high-valuation player i has less incentive to undertake this deviation than a low-valuation player i, using arguments like the Intuitive and D1 refinements in pure signalling games with one sender, as in Cho and Kreps (1987) . However, for a first-round deviation by donor i to a level higher thanw i , there are reasonable grounds for some restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs -precisely because the donor cannot undo the effect of such contribution in the second stage. Thus, if a donor contributes an amount exceeding x L , the standalone contribution level for an L-type, it can be argued that such a contribution could only come from an H-type agent. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified in the paper assign all probability mass to the high-valuation type and therefore meets any such restriction.
Observe that Ôalmost allÕ (of the continuum of) equilibria in the class E are characterised by repeated contributions by both donors; the realised second-round contributions may be less or more than the first-round contributions. It can be shown that (see Appendix):
Lemma 2. In every (second-round) continuation game following announcement of first-round contributions, the prescribed strategies in E constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
It now remains to verify that no one would deviate in Round 1. Suppose only player i ¼ 1, 2 of type L deviates in Round 1 and contributes w 6 ¼w i . Then, no contribution comes from player j 6 ¼ i in Round 2. Thus,
Next, observe that if player i sticks to equilibrium play, his payoff
Thus, deviation cannot be gainful. (The second inequality above follows from the fact that, on the equilibrium path, player i of L-type maximises his expected utility by contributing zero in the second round.)
Suppose only player i ¼ 1, 2 of type H deviates in Round 1 and contributes w 6 ¼w i . Then, again, no contribution comes from player j 6 ¼ i in Round 2. Thus, player i Õs deviation payoff is
Observe that if w ! x H Àw j , then the deviation payoff in (4) is
On the other hand, if w < x H Àw j , then the deviation payoff in (4) is
Next observe that if player i sticks to equilibrium play, his payoff
Thus, deviation cannot be gainful. (The third inequality above follows from the fact that, on the equilibrium path, player i of H-type maximises his expected utility by contributing z H i in the second round.) Note that in an equilibrium of the class E, the first-round ÔpoolingÕ contribution levels can differ between the two players so that in the first round, it is possible that a lowvaluation donor actually contributes more than the other donor even though the latter is a high-valuation donor.
Comparison of Announcement
In Section 3, we have shown that in every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with announcement of contributions, the first-round contributions satisfy w
We will refer to x ¼ x 1 þ x 2 as the total contribution in the first round.
Lemma 3. Assume p 1 p 2 , p 1 > 0 and p 2 < 1. Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the two-rounds game with announcement where the total contribution in the first round, denoted by x, satisfies x >ỹ andỹ is defined by (1). Then, on the equilibrium path, each low-type player contributes zero in the second round: z L i ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2. Further, the high type of each player i contributes an amount z H i > 0. Finally, the following holds: z
where ðy
Þ is an equilibrium of the one-shot contribution game (no announcement).
Note that Lemma 3 is a characterisation of a subset of equilibria of the game with announcement of contributions. In Section 3.2, we constructed a class of equilibria E (containing a continuum of equilibria) that satisfy the conditions in the hypothesis of Lemma 3. Our main result, stated next, shows that such equilibria may strictly dominate (in terms of expected total contribution) any equilibrium of the contribution game with no announcement.
Proposition 2. Suppose that at least one of the following holds:
1. Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with announcement of contributions, where the combined total contribution by the players in the first round exceedsỹ (defined by (1)). Such an equilibrium generates strictly higher expected total contribution than that generated in any equilibrium of the game with no announcement of contributions.
We like to make two remarks. First, for the dominance of the announcement strategy, neither of the two conditions stated in the hypothesis of Proposition 2 are necessary. While the conditions help us to compare expected total contributions using the first-order marginal conditions defining Bayes-Nash equilibrium, it is not difficult to see from our proof in the Appendix that there is a large class of situations where the domination holds even though neither of the two conditions hold; they should be seen as strong sufficient conditions that are easily verifiable and transparent. Second, we can now specify the precise sense in which announcement of donations is better for the charity in our framework. Define S 1 , S 2 by S 1 ¼ set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the two-rounds game where the total contribution in the first round >ỹ:
S 2 ¼ set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the two-rounds game where the total contribution in the first round ỹ:
Then, S 1 6 ¼ ; by our equilibrium construction, E, in Section 3.2. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, every equilibrium in S 1 strictly dominates all Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game with no announcement. Further, for each equilibrium in S 2 , it is easy to verify that there is some equilibrium of the game with no announcement that generates exactly the same distribution of contributions.
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In particular, if the game with no announcement has a unique equilibrium, then under the conditions of Proposition 2, the game with announcement Ôweakly dominatesÕ the game with no announcement in terms of expected total contribution and there exist a continuum of equilibria of the game with announcement that generate strictly higher expected total contributions than the game with no announcement.
Intuitively, the strategy of announcing donations induces a kind of pre-emptive race that may compel either player to make a positive and non-trivial donation in the first round so as not to be perceived as a high-value type by the other player. The resulting total contribution in Round 1 could be so high that in Round 2 complete crowding out is not possible, and on average (over various possible realisations of types) total contributions in the two-rounds game with announcement turn out to be strictly larger than in the case of no announcement.
15 Simply set, y s i ¼ x i þ z s i and using the conditions for an equilibrium in the second round of the contribution game with announcement, verify that this is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the one-shot simultaneous move contribution game.
Proposition 2 gives sufficient conditions for the domination of announcement strategy over non-announcement. We can also state a necessary condition for the domination to hold.
Proposition 3. The expected total contribution in any PBE of the contribution game with announcement is strictly higher than that in all equilibria of the game with no announcement only if the second-round contributions after announcement satisfy z
Proposition 3 implies that if announcement of contributions is followed by a strictly positive contribution by some low-type player then there is an equilibrium of the game with no announcement that yields the same expected total contribution. The announcement strategy yields strictly higher expected total contribution for the charity only when the first-round contributions are large enough to cause incomplete crowding out in which case the low-type donors must hit the non-negativity constraint on their contributions.
Donation Announcement: Non-commitment Case
The above analysis of fundraising with announcement assumes that the charity precommits to announcing all donations independent of the contribution levels. However, it is quite possible that the charity cannot pre-commit to an announcement strategy. In that case, would the charity find it optimal to announce contributions?
We argue briefly that charities may announce contributions even when they cannot pre-commit to doing so. The domination of announcement over non-announcement may continue to hold even when the charity cannot commit to announcing donations prior to the contribution game.
Consider the two-rounds contribution game of incomplete information described in Section 1 and now assume that the charity decides whether or not to announce contributions after observing the actions chosen by donors in the first round. However, for simplicity, assume that if the charity announces contributions, then it must announce contributions of both players. We argue that there is an equilibrium where first-round contributions are always announced and the generated total contributions are identical to that in equilibrium E (see Section 3.2) of the game where the charity commits ex ante to an announcement strategy.
To see this, consider the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs:
(*) If the charity does not announce first-round contributions then each player believes that the total contribution (in the first round) must be at least x H .
This out-of-equilibrium belief is quite intuitive -only when very large amounts have been contributed in the first stage would the charity have an incentive to hide it so as not to reduce the incentive to donate in the second round. Given this belief, if the charity does not announce first-round contributions, each player contributes zero in the second round which is optimal for the players.
Choose any equilibrium in class E as described in Section 3.2. For the equilibrium we construct, the details are as follows. Independent of amount contributed, the charity announces donations. If it deviates and does not announce donations, second-round contributions are zero. In Round 1, each player makes the same pooling contributions w 1 andw 2 and if they are announced, they are followed by the same Round 2 contributions as in the chosen equilibrium from E. When contributions are announced, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs following a player's (i.e., a donor's) unilateral deviation from the equilibrium contribution in Round 1 and Round 2 play following such deviation are also the same as in the chosen equilibrium from E. If contributions are not announced, beliefs are as in (*) and both players contribute zero. It is easy to see that the expected total contribution is identical to that when the charity commits to announcing all donations and the chosen equilibrium in class E is played.
Information Transmission by Charity
Our analysis of the contribution game has so far been carried out under the assumption of an exogenously given (incomplete) information structure among potential donors and we have argued that private information about preferences of donors creates an important incentive for charities to announce contributions during the fund-drive. We have not allowed for the possibility of deliberate strategic manipulation of the information structure by the fundraiser. This is quite realistic in situations where there is no scope for the fundraising charity to be significantly more informed about the preferences of any potential donor (in addition to what is publicly known to all other donors).
However, in certain situations, the fundraising charity may acquire superior information about the private preferences of potential donors which it may, if it wishes, reveal to other donors. The fundraiser may acquire this information through careful research prior to the actual campaign, establishing contacts with targeted potential major donors before soliciting contributions and on the basis of historical interaction with same donors in the past. 16 For example, universities carrying out capital and other fundraising campaigns are often observed to contact high profile alumni and important corporate sponsors in their carefully organised pre-fundraising events. 17 In the presence of such superior information, it becomes important to analyse the incentives of the charity to communicate this information to donors thereby mitigating the extent of incomplete information. Indeed, if the charity is fully informed and conveys all its information to all donors, then the contribution game is one of complete information in which case there is no further role for announcement of contributions (in our framework).
In this Section, we briefly explore the incentives for strategic transmission of superior information by charities and its impact on the role of announcement of contributions during fundraising. To do this, we make the extreme assumption that the fundraising charity receives full information about the type of each donor (though it is not known to other donors) and decides whether or not to reveal this publicly to both donors. In particular, the charity cannot reveal its information to one donor and not to the other. We also assume that the fundraiser cannot misrepresent its information; if it chooses to reveal the types of the donors, it must do so truthfully (to all potential donors). Finally, we assume that the fundraising charity cannot pre-commit (before observing the realisation of types) to not reveal any type-related information.
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Our information transmission mechanism can be seen as a reduced form representation of a process whereby the charity has the option of introducing potential donors to other prospective donors through a public fund-drive launching event and other events that facilitate information communication links between potential donors. During such events the charity may highlight who are the interested sponsors for the particular cause and may even ask them to make brief statements explaining what it means to them to be part of the charitable cause. 19 In introductions of this nature, it might be argued, sponsors cannot hide their types by projecting something other than their true self. Alternatively the charity can disclose, in sophisticated ways, information relating to the sponsorsÕ Ôsocial identityÕ (for example, economic status or social attributes) that can provide indirect information about the sponsorsÕ true valuations. Note that a prospective donor's social identity, which may be correctly identified by the fundraising team, is different from the donor's common-knowledge identity in the fundraising game. The charity's role is to provide the means to expose (or hide) such type-related information at the beginning of the fund-drive.
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Based on the initial prior, the equilibrium belief about the strategy of the fundraising charity and the charity's information disclosure/non-disclosure, each donor updates his subjective belief about the type of the other donor in a Bayesian fashion. After this, the donors play the contribution game. As before, we look at two variants of the contribution game -a two-rounds simultaneous move game with announcement of contributions at the end of the first round and one with no announcement of contributions which is equivalent to a one-shot simultaneous move game. The charity's payoff is the expected total contribution generated while the donorsÕ payoffs are as specified in the previous Sections.
Note that if both donors acquire full information about each other's types before the contribution game begins (either because the charity reveals this information or because the donors can infer it from the charity's action), then the contribution game 18 Most fundraising charities acquire information about donors through pre-campaign research and investigation of potential donors and by drawing on historical experience of fundraising in previous campaigns. While some fundraising charities may continue to acquire information during the campaign, it is most likely that much of the relevant information about donors would have been acquired before the actual launch of the campaign. In these cases, the question of pre-commitment to revelation or non-revelation of information about donorsÕ types before knowing the realised types, is not very relevant. Also note that unless potential donors insist on complete anonymity with regard to any mention of their involvement with the particular charitable cause, assurances by the charity not to release donor related information may not be credible. In fact, preliminary fundraising events that highlight and publicise potential major donors are now integral parts of most large campaigns.
19 Such events are sometimes called road shows (with celebratory lunches and dinners) but may also be part of media campaign where charities also outline their objectives/missions. Bringing together potential key donors and facilitating communication links are parts of a multitude of objectives here. 20 Our model rules out the possibility of the charity finding out information about donor types during the first round of contributions. See footnote 18. is a complete information game in which case the outcome of the contribution games with and without announcement are identical.
Formally, the game begins with ÔnatureÕ choosing a pair of realised types for the two potential donors that we refer to as states of nature from the set T of all possible states T ¼ fðL; H Þ; ðH ; LÞ; ðH ; H Þ; ðL; LÞg;
where the first (second) entry in a pair refers to donor 1Õs (donor 2Õs) type. The charity's information transmission strategy can then be summarised by an announcement set A & T consisting of states that, if realised, will be revealed to donors. If the charity chooses not to reveal any state, then A ¼ ;, the empty set. Given any announcement set A, we can talk about a concealment set C & T where A c ¼ C.
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As in the previous Sections, our main purpose of analysing this game is to compare the generated contributions between two alternative designs of the fund-drive (following information transmission) -one with no announcement of contribution and the other with announcement of contributions.
Our first result characterises the outcome for the case of no announcement of contributions.
Proposition 4. Consider the game where the charity does not announce contributions during the fund-drive. Then, in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the total contribution generated (for each realisation of types) is exactly identical to that generated under complete information. The (ex ante) expected total contribution generated is equal to
The proof is contained in the Appendix. In particular, the proof establishes that either the equilibrium is one where the donors are able to infer the realised state fully from the equilibrium strategy of the charity, or it is one where the equilibrium contributions (for each pair of realised types) are exactly what they would be if the donors knew each other's types with certainty. At the heart of this result is a process of informational unravelling whose basic intuition is as follows. For concealment to be strictly beneficial to the charity ex post (i.e., after knowing the true state), it must be that the charity wants the donor to believe that the state could be something other than the true state with positive probability, as such a belief could generate higher contributions. But when the more beneficial state(s) (beneficial from charity's point of view) are realised, the charity is obviously better off announcing the true state(s). Thus the strategy of ex post concealment tends to unravel. Note that the lack of commitment power by the charity to withhold favourable information is a crucial factor behind the informational unravelling. 22 A similar type of unravelling argument appears in the literature in various contexts; see Bac and Bag (2003) for an application in the context of fundraising, and some of the references cited there for other applications. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) offer an analysis of when unravelling may or may not occur in a broadly defined strategic environment. However, their sufficient conditions for full revelation are not met in our context; in particular, the equilibrium of the contribution game (following information transmission) is not necessarily unique, which was a basic assumption in Okuno-Fujiwara et al.
Proposition 4 assumes common knowledge about the charity's full knowledge of player types. If there is some uncertainty in the charity's acquisition of information about the correct state, then the unravelling argument breaks down. For instance, announcing types in order to benefit from a possible gainful deviation from a concealing equilibrium is simply not feasible. Also, the Ôdue-scepticismÕ inference that is often invoked to induce full revelation cannot be applied. 23 We now turn to a different extensive form where the contribution game following the charity's transmission of information is one where contributions are announced at the end of the first round. In this game, each donor updates his belief about the type of the other donor twice: first, after the charity's information transmission (and prior to choosing the first-round contribution) and second, after the first-round contributions have been announced (and prior to choosing the second-round contribution). Interestingly, and in contrast to the game analysed above where donors play a one-shot simultaneous move contribution game after information transmission by the charity (no announcement of contributions), the informational unravelling result does not hold for all equilibria. There are situations where the charity does better by selective transmission of information and by suppressing some type profiles. We demonstrate this by constructing an equilibrium with this property.
A partially revealing equilibrium, E 1 : The details of the construction are contained in the Appendix. Suppose that x H À x L is large enough (in a sense to be specified in the Appendix). Consider the following strategies and beliefs.
Charity's information transmission strategy:
C ¼ fðL; LÞ; ðL; H Þ; ðH ; H Þg; A ¼ fðH ; LÞg:
If information is transmitted by the charity, then the two rounds contribution game with announcement is effectively reduced to a one-shot simultaneous move game of complete information. In such a subgame, the equilibrium strategies for donors 1 and 2 are specified as in a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot complete information game (there could many such Nash equilibria where the types of the two donors are identical) and yield a total contribution of x L if the transmitted state is (L, L) and x H , otherwise.
If no information is transmitted by the charity, then each donor still believes that the other donor could be of either H or L type, with strictly positive probabilities, with one exception. An H-type donor 1 would know for sure that donor 2 must also be an H type; however, it is not common knowledge that donor 2 is of type H.
The equilibrium path following no information transmission by the charity is as follows:
First-round contributions:
23 The principle of due-scepticism simply says that whenever an agent does not report his type, or reports a non-singleton subset of types containing the true type, the other agents believe that the actual type must be the worst element (from the reporting agent's point of view) in the reported type set.
Beliefs following announcement of first-round contributions:
If
Second-round contributions:
In the Appendix we check that E 1 is indeed a PBE. Observe that in the proposed equilibrium, the total contribution is x L þ when type profile is (L, L), and x H otherwise. Thus, the outcome of the equilibrium constructed weakly dominates (from charity's point of view) the outcome when the charity always reveals player types (which would be the case if, for instance, the charity pre-commits to not announce the first-round contributions).
The implication of an equilibrium like E 1 is that even when the charity has the option of removing incompleteness of information among donors prior to the actual contribution process, it may choose not to do so if it understands how lack of information about other donorsÕ preferences can create incentives for donors to contribute higher amounts in multistage fund-drives. Further, fundraising schemes with announcement of contributions may involve lower incentives for charities to reveal their private information about preferences of donors and actually generate higher expected total contribution than fundraising schemes with no announcement of contributions.
Conclusion
Announcements of individual donor contributions during the fundraising drive creates strategic incentives for potential donors with independent private valuation of the charity to contribute repeatedly and for high valuation contributors to contribute in early rounds at a level so as to conceal their types. By designing a fund-drive where contributions are announced after each round, charities may gain in terms of expected total contribution (relative to non-announcement). The strategic role of contribution announcement in raising expected contribution continues to hold even when the charity (or fundraiser) may ensure that the private information of every potential donors is revealed (to other donors) prior to the contribution game; the extent of incomplete information under which donors contribute to the charity may be higher in fundraising with announcement and this can help generate higher contributions by donors (relative to non-announcement during fund-drives).
Low-and High-types of the other player must be contributing zero. Therefore, the first player's High-type must be contributing exactly x H . The maximum contribution of the Low-type of that player is x L . But then the expected marginal utility at zero contribution by the second player, when he is of H-type, is strictly greater than 1, implying that zero contribution could not be (expected) utility maximising. h
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that there is no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the two-rounds contribution game with announcement where the first-round contributions satisfy: w 
Consider the incentive compatibility of an H-type player i. The equilibrium payoff of the player is ½p j E i þ ð1 À p j ÞÊ i where
is the payoff to player i when the other player j is of type H, and
is the payoff to player i when the other player j is of type L. Now, consider a deviation by player i of type H where he contributes w L i in the first round (thus pretending to be an L-type player). If the state of nature is such that the other player j is revealed to be of type H in the first round, then in the second round player j (as part of his PBE strategy, given the first-round contributions and believing player i to be of type L) makes the contribution needed (if at all) to ensure that the total contribution is at least as large as x H ; knowing this, player i rationally contributes 0 in the second round, so that player iÕs (deviation) payoff in this state is
Further, as contributing zero is a best response for player i in the second round, his payoff is at least as large as what he would obtain if his second-round contribution is set at maxf0; maxðx H ; w
From (10) and (12) :
If the state of nature is such that the other player j is revealed to be of L-type in the first round, then in the continuation play in the second round, player j contributes c L j (as part of his PBE strategy, believing player i to be of type L and given the first-round contributions); knowing this, player i contributes his best response to this; letD i denote the (deviation) payoff obtained by player i when he plays this best response. ThenD i must be at least as large as what player i obtains if he contributes maxf0; 
The expected payoff to player i of type H from the entire deviation strategy is
Let w be the function defined by:
Note that w(AE) is strictly concave and attains its maximum at x H . First, suppose that
Choose i such that (16) holds. We will show that D i À E i > 0. To see this note that using (16) and (13)
Þg so that using (10):
Next, we consider a situation where
but (16) does not hold i.e.,
(note that by hypothesis:
. We will show that under (18) and (17), D i > E i for some i. To establish this, we first claim that there exists some i such that:
To see this, suppose not. Then,
and using (9) and (17) we have
a contradiction. Choose player i such that (19) holds. Then, from (14) we have (17) holds, then
We will now show that if either (16) or (17) holds, then
To see this, first note that w (20) and (21) (and using 0 < p j < 1), we have that if either (16) or (17) holds, there exists some i such that
i.e., (some) agent i of type H has a strict incentive to deviate.
In what follows, we consider the situation where neither (16) nor (17) holds. This implies that (18) holds and, in addition,
We will show that some L-type player has a strict incentive to deviate. Let this hypothetical L-type player be player i. On the equilibrium path, if player j 6 ¼ i is of type H then in the second round only player j makes the necessary contribution to raise total contribution (in the two rounds together) to x H ; player i makes no contribution in the second round, and the payoff to player i is given by:
If player j is of type L, then no contribution is made in the second round (use (22) and the fact that x H > x L ) and the payoff to player i is given bŷ
Now, suppose player i of type L deviates and pretends to be of H-type by contributing w H i in the first round. In the state of nature where player j is of type H, in the continuation game (second round), player j will contribute c H j (as part of his PBE strategy, given the first-round contributions and believing player i to be of type H) and, knowing this, player i contributes maxfx L À ðw
In the state of nature where player j is of type L, he will make no contribution in the second round (as part of his PBE strategy, given his belief that player i is of type H), and so in the second round player i will contribute maxfx L À ðw H i þ w L j Þ; 0g and the deviation payoff to player i in this state is given by:
Let u be the function defined by:
Note that u is strictly concave and attains its (unique) maximum at x L . First, we claim that for some i 6 ¼ j, 
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Choose i such that (27) holds. Consider player i when he is of type L. Our first step is to show that
From (23) and (25), we have:
We will now establish that
To see this, suppose
Then, from (29) we have:
On the other hand, if (31) does not hold i.e.,
then from (29) we have:
We claim that (33) implies that
To see the second inequality in (36) suppose to the contrary that
x H that, in turn, contradicts (36). Using (35) in (34) we have:
From (32) and (37), we have that in general, (30) holds. Observe that
, ( so that (30) implies that (28) holds.
Next, we show that
From (24) and (26)
x L . Then, from (39) we havê
Thus, (38) holds. Combining (28) and (38) we have that under (18) and (22),
i.e., some player i of type L has a strict incentive to deviate. This completes the proof of the fact that there is no PBE where the first-round contributions satisfy:
Next, we show that there does not exist a PBE where the first-round contributions satisfy: w 
It is easy to check (which we omit) that x 2 < x H . We claim that
To see this note that an L-type player 1 can always get a payoff at least
] by contributing maxfx L À x 2 , 0g in Round 1 (with player 2 contributing x 2 ). If an L-type player 1 contributes w L 1 ! x H À x 2 in Round 1, he reveals his type successfully but does not elicit any contribution from the other player in Round 2 (in Round 2, both players contribute 0 as existing public good weakly exceeds the standalone levels for both types) so that his payoff is ½t L V ðw
Next, we claim that if (40) holds then an H-type player 1 has an incentive to deviate and contribute w L 1 instead of w H 1 in the first round. To see this, observe that if an H-type player 1 contributes w H 1 then his type is revealed. In the second round, player 2 will have no incentive to contribute whatever be his type as he knows that he can rely on player 1 to contribute ½x H À ðw H 1 þ x 2 Þ and the latter is indeed the best response of player 1 of type H in Round 2 if he expects player 2 to contribute 0 with probability 1.
24 Therefore, the payoff to player 1 when he 24 To see that player 2 will free-ride completely in Round 2, suppose not.
. This means total contribution in the two rounds together is x H if player 2 is of type H, and maxðx L ; w H 1 þ x 2 þ zÞ < x H (the inequality follows by our contraposition hypothesis) if player 2 is of type L . Now write player 2Õs first-order condition in the second round with z ! 0, as follows:
On the other hand, if he mimics his L-type action and chooses w L 1 in Round 1, then we have a simultaneous move game in Round 2 where player 2 believes that player 1 is of type L with probability 1. The continuation payoff for player 1 (in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game where w L 1 þ x 2 amount of public good is already provided and with the stated beliefs) must be equal to:
The last inequality follows from the fact that z H 2 > 0, i.e., player 2 will make a positive contribution in Round 2 if he is of H-type.
25 Thus, player 1 of type H is strictly better off by deviating. This concludes the proof that player 1Õs type is never revealed in equilibrium. h
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the second-round game for any x 2 ½ỹ; x H Þ. We want to show that there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium ðz 
This problem has a unique solution z Ã i ¼ R i ðzÞ for each z and the maximand is continuous in z . From the Maximum Theorem it follows that R i (z) is continuous in z . It is obvious that
Note that R i (0) is identical for i ¼ 1, 2. Let z i be uniquely defined by
Note that z i may differ between i ¼ 1 and i ¼ 2. It is easy to check that
Finally, the strict concavity of V(AE) implies that the maximisation problem in (41) is strictly submodular in (z i , z) so that for z 2 ½0; z i Þ; R i ðzÞ is a strictly decreasing function (you can also see it by differentiating the relevant first-order condition implicitly). This also implies R i (z) is invertible on ½0;
. Then, f(AE) is continuous on its domain and one can verify that (if is close enough to zero) 25 Suppose, to the contrary, that z H 2 ¼ 0. Then, it must be true that z L 2 ¼ 0. As player 2 believes that player 1 is an L-type player with probability one, he must rationally expect z 
The first-order conditions corresponding to the BayesNash equilibrium of the one-shot simultaneous contribution game are as follows: 
Note particularly that of the last four conditions, (50) and (52) hold by our arguments in the initial part of this proof that z H 1 > 0; z H 2 > 0. So our remaining task is to show that the other two conditions, (49) and (51), also hold.
We claim that
Then using the two sets of first-order conditions above (assume for the time being that the second set of first-order conditions also hold) and the fact that V 00 (AE) < 0, it follows that
By adding the respective sides of (53) and (55) we obtain 2008 ]
Given (54), from (56) it must follow that
2 along with conditions (45), (46) and (50) and the fact that V(AE) is strictly concave to conclude that the condition (49) must be satisfied. Similarly, using the results that
1 along with conditions (47), (48) and (52) and V(AE) strictly concave to conclude that the condition (51) must be satisfied. This completes the argument that given any x 2 ½ỹ; x H Þ, the configurations z Next we show more generally that, in equilibrium, following any total contribution x ! 0 in Round 1, in the second round z Proof of Proposition 2. The expected total contribution in the constructed equilibrium of the two-rounds game equals
The expected total contribution in any equilibrium (y
Þ of the one-shot game equals
We will first consider the case where (i) holds. Comparing (57) and (59) and using Lemma 4, the expected total contribution corresponding to (57), p 1 ðz
which establishes the Proposition.
Next, consider the case where (ii) holds. Observe that
Multiplying both sides of (5) by p 1 and both sides of (7) by p 2 and adding them we obtain:
1 and (70) holds. The proof is complete. h Proof of Proposition 3. In the proof of Lemma 3 we already established that z H i > 0; i ¼ 1; 2. So write the first-order conditions for any equilibrium of the two-rounds contribution game with x > 0 as the total contribution in Round 1, as follows:
where (71) and (73) hold with equality if z L 1 > 0; z L 2 > 0 respectively. The first-order conditions for an equilibrium of the one-shot contribution game are as follows:
with (75) and (77) holding with equality if y (73) holds with equality. We will argue that for any equilibrium profile ðx; z
2 Þ in the two-rounds game, there is a corresponding equilibrium in the one-shot game with the same expected total contribution. To see this, set y (71)- (74) (77) with equality is guaranteed by the condition (73). By construction, the equilibrium of the one-shot game yields the same total contribution as the two-rounds game for each combination of player types. Thus, the two game forms yield identical expected total contributions. The above argument shows that for the two-rounds contribution game to yield a strictly higher expected total contribution (compared to the one-shot game), it must be that z Table 1 . In order for an equilibrium of the game C to be less than fully revealing, the concealment set must contain at least two elements. The strategies (C 6 , A 6 ) and (C 11 , A 11 ) are clearly revealing. Below we verify that either the concealing strategies in Table 1 can be eliminated in equilibrium, or when there is a concealing equilibrium it yields the same total contribution compared to the situation where the charity always reveals information about donor types.
Ruling out (C 1 , A 1 ). We claim that at least one of the following must hold:ỹ
2 must be positive. Then either L-type player 1Õs or L-type player 2Õs first-order condition (or possibly both) must be violated:
Thus, our claim is established and the charity benefits by deviating and announcing at least one of the following type
, that results in a higher total contribution. This shows that the strategy (C 1 , A 1 ) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Ruling out (C 2 , A 2 ). We claim that at least one of the following must hold:ỹ
Since in the proposed equilibrium an L-type player 1 knows for sure that he is facing an H-type player 2, 2008 ] 87
, then L-type player 1 is better off lowering contribution below the proposed equilibrium level ofỹ L 1 ), which in turn implies thatỹ
But then H-type player 1Õs first-order condition cannot be satisfied:
Hence our claim is established and the charity would deviate to announce (L, H) or (H, L) as that would increase total contribution to x H . Hence (C 2 , A 2 ) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Ruling out (C 3 , A 3 ). We claim thatỹ
Given that in the proposed equilibrium an H-type player knows for sure that he is facing an L-type of the other player, and an L-type player never contributes more than x L , it must be that bothỹ
2 must be positive. Then either L-type player 1 or L-type player 2Õs first-order condition must be violated:
because x H > x L andp 1 > 0;p 2 > 0; a contradiction. Hence our claim is established and the charity would deviate to announce (L, L) as that would increase total contribution to x L . Thus, (C 3 , A 3 ) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
(C 4 , A 4 ). We are going to argue that either (C 4 , A 4 ) (in equilibrium) yields the same total contribution for each type-pair realisation as in the case where the charity always reveals the types, or the strategy (C 4 , A 4 ) can be ruled out as an equilibrium. 
Conceals pl 1Õs
Conceals pl 2Õs in which case L-type player 2Õs first-order condition would be violated, implying that (C 4 , A 4 ) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
On the other hand, ifỹ
2 ! x H (so that a direct contradiction cannot be achieved), then it must be thatỹ
, because L-type player 1 knows for sure in equilibrium (following nonannouncement) that he is facing an L-type player 2. Thus, if (C 4 , A 4 ) were to be part of an equilibrium of C, then it must be that
yielding the same total contributions as in the case where the charity always reveals the types, and is thus payoff equivalent.
The case of (C 5 , A 5 ) is similar to (C 4 , A 4 ).
(C 7 , A 7 ). It is easy to see that the contributions ðỹ 26 This equilibrium is payoff equivalent for each type-pair realisation to the equilibrium in the case where the charity always reveals the types.
On the other hand, supposeỹ H 2 < x H (contrary to the equilibrium just constructed). Theñ y
0g. But then the charity would deviate and announce (L, H) (because the total contribution under non-announcement is less than x H ), upsetting the proposed equilibrium (C 7 , A 7 ).
Thus, either (C 7 , A 7 ) is part of an equilibrium of C that is payoff equivalent to the case where the charity always reveals the types, or (C 7 , A 7 ) is not part of an equilibrium.
The case of (C 8 , A 8 ) is similar to (C 7 , A 7 ).
(C 9 , A 9 ). It is easy to see that the contributions ðỹ
2 ¼ 0Þ will constitute an equilibrium (with appropriate beliefs), where the charity plays (C 9 , A 9 ). This equilibrium is payoff equivalent for each type-pair realisation to the equilibrium in the case where the charity always reveals the types.
On the other hand, supposeỹ H 2 < x H (contrary to the equilibrium just constructed). Theñ y L 1 ¼ maxfx L Àỹ H 2 ; 0g. But then the charity would deviate and announce (L, H) (because the total contribution under non-announcement is less than x H ), upsetting the proposed equilibrium (C 9 , A 9 ).
Suppose nowỹ L 2 < x L (another possibility, contrary to the equilibrium constructed above). Then one cannot haveỹ L 1 < x L Àỹ L 2 because then the charity would deviate and announce type realisation (L, L), upsetting the equilibrium. So it must be thatỹ
But then H-type player 2Õs best response (who knows that he is facing an L-type player 1, in equilibrium) would haveỹ H 2 < x H , which contradicts that in equilibriumỹ H 2 < x H must hold. Hence,ỹ L 2 < x L is not possible in equilibrium.
Thus, either (C 9 , A 9 ) is part of an equilibrium of C that is payoff equivalent to the case where the charity always reveals the types, or (C 9 , A 9 ) is not part of an equilibrium. 26 For any equilibrium involving (C 7 , A 7 ) andỹ H 2 ¼ x H , the proposed contributions following non-announcement are unique.
The case of (C 10 , A 10 ) is similar to (C 9 , A 9 ). This proof is now complete. h Verification of the equilibrium E 1 Following the discussion in the text, we need to verify that the strategies and beliefs specified in E 1 in Section 5 will form a PBE, so long as x H À x L is not too small. It is obvious that there is no incentive to deviate for the either donor in the contribution game following transmission of the information. Consider the continuation contribution game when no information is transmitted by the charity.
If donor 1 of L-type deviates in Round 1, the overall contribution is x L , with donor 1 contributing the entire amount and donor 2 contributing zero; following the deviation, contributing x L (in the two rounds together) is donor 1Õs best strategy;
If L-type donor 1 does not deviate in Round 1, the overall contribution is:
(1) w with probability ð1 À p 2 Þ (where p 2 > 0 is the conditional probability that donor 2 is of type H given donor 1Õs type); (2) x H with probability p 2 , where donor 2Õs contribution is x H À w.
The fact that donor 2 contributes x H À w (which is not too small) with a positive probability when donor 1 does not deviate, and donor 2 contributes zero otherwise with donor 1 saving only a small amount (w À x L ¼ ), implies that donor 1 is better off not deviating.
If H-type donor 1 deviates in Round 1, the overall contribution is x H (all of which is contributed by donor 1); if he does not deviate then the overall contribution is x H , but donor 2 (who is known by donor 1 to be of type H for sure) provides x H À w > 0. Clearly, H-type donor 1 will not deviate.
It is easy to check that player 2 will not deviate either in the first round or in the second round. Finally, consider the incentive of the charity to deviate at its information transmission stage. Such deviation can take the form of concealing realised state (H, L) or transmitting information about one of the following states: (L, L), (L, H), (H, H). The charity will not conceal (H, L) because concealment would yield total contribution equal to x L þ that is less than x H . If the charity announces any of the states (L, L), (L, H) or (H, H), the generated total contribution is at most x H and so there is no incentive to deviate. This completes verification of the PBE.
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